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Abstract 
By extending Cournot model, this paper investigates how the appearance of open source software (OSS) affects the 
R&D risk in a market initially monopolized by proprietary software (PS) producer. The software market exhibits 
network externality. It is found that (i) the R&D risk level of PS producer in the market monopolized by PS isn’t 
higher than in this market emerging OSS; (ii) there exist some R&D cost functions making R&D risk level be lower 
when PS producer monopolizes the market than when it competes with an OSS producer. 
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1. Introduction 
Recent years, open source software has been achieved great success and becomes a powerful rival to 
proprietary software in many software markets. For examples, in server operating system market, the 
open source Linux operating system shares about 30%, where Microsoft’s Windows, a proprietary 
software product, holds approximately 50% [1]. Open source software is software whose source code 
allows software developers to share, identify and correct errors, and redistribute, which is usually 
available at no charge, and which is often developed by voluntary efforts [2]. Recently, the academic 
literature has paid close attention to open source problem, in which the research on competition between 
open source and proprietary software is a hot area. From a technology, user skill and product innovation 
effort point of view, scholars have investigated the competition between open source and proprietary 
software (see [3], [4] and [5]). However they haven’t analyzed how the emergence of open source 
software affects the R&D risk of proprietary software producer. In [6], we have considered the R&D risk 
of proprietary software firm when open source software appears. However, that paper only analyzes a 
linear R&D risk function and supposes the market doesn’t exhibit network externality. By assuming 
∗ Corresponding author. Tel.:+8613964638621 
E-mail address: mqxing1979@163.com 
Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.
1383Mingqing Xing / Procedia Engineering 15 (2011) 1382 – 13872 Mingqing Xing ，et al/ Procedia Engineering 00 (2011) 000–000 
software market exhibits network externality and R&D risk function is general, this paper investigates 
how the appearance of open source software affects the R&D risk of proprietary software producer. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Two models are set up and solved in section 2. The 
optimal R&D risk levels are compared in section 3. The paper is concluded in final part. 
2. The basic models 
To investigate the influence of open source software to the R&D risk of proprietary software 
producer, two models are presented in this paper. One model supposes proprietary software producer 
monopolizes a software market. The other one supposes proprietary software producer competes with 
open source software. Two models are set up and solved respectively. 
2.1. PS monopolizes the  market 
This part supposes there only exists a proprietary software producer, noted by producer ‘ p ’, in a 
software market. By extending Cournot model, the inverse demand function for PS producer is given by  
p p p pp a q q= + α − ,                                                                                                                         
(1) 
where  and  ( ) measure the reservation price and output of proprietary software respectively; 
denotes network externality on the demand function, in which α  ( ) represents the intensity of 
network externality. 
pa pq 0> pqα
( , )0 1∈
To increase software reservation price, proprietary software producer carries on R&D innovation. 
When the R&D effort for proprietary software producer is λ , it needs to bear investment cost equal to 
( , )I μ σ , which denotes producer’s R&D cost function. This paper supposes proprietary software producer is 
uncertain about the final R&D outcome ( λ ) when it performs R&D activities, and λ obeys probability 
distribution ~ [ , ]λ σ [ , )0, where μμ ∈ ∞ min max[ , ]σ∈ σ σ
( )E λ =
 and  denote the expected value and variance of  λ
respectively (i.e. μ  and ). Moreover, I( )V λ = σ ( , )σ  is assumed to satisfy μ ( , )I 0> ,∂ μ σ ∂μ
( , )I 0∂ ,μ σ ∂σ > ( , )2 2 andI 0∂ μ σ ∂σ ≥ ( , )I 0∂ μ σ ∂μ∂σ =
0p p
a a= + λ
0
. After R&D investment, the reservation price for 
proprietary software is 
.                                                                                                                                          
(2)
pa  is the software reservation price before PS producer performs R&D activities. In (2), 
According to (1) and (2), we obtain the profit function for proprietary software producer 
( ) ( , )
0p p p p p p p
p q a q q q Iπ = = + λ + α − − μ σ
p
.                                                                                             
(3) 
Note that this paper supposes the marginal cost for proprietary software equals zero. 
      The timing of PS producer’s activities is as follows: it implements R&D innovation in the first stage 
and decides software quantity in the second stage. We solve the model by backwards induction. The 
second stage is considered firstly and then the first stage is analyzed.
Stage 2: quantity 
By taking the derivative of (3) with respect to q , and then setting it equal to zero (i.e. 
( )
0p p p p
q a 2 1 q 0∂π ∂ = + λ − −α = ), we obtain the optimal quantity of PS producer 
* ( ) [ ( )]
0p p
q a 2 1= + λ −α .                                                                                                                          (4) 
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Obviously,  satisfies the second order condition (i.e. *pq ( )2 2p pq 2 1∂ π ∂ = − −α < 0 ), so it is the unique optimal 
solution. 
Combining (4), (1) and (3), we obtain the profit for proprietary software defined exclusively on R&D 
effort and risk variable  
( ) [ ( )] ( ,
0
2
p pa 4 1 Iπ = + λ −α − )μ σ .                                                                                                            (5) 
Stage 1: R&D innovation 
Proprietary software producer decides R&D risk in this stage. Because PS producer is uncertain about 
the final R&D outcome when carrying on R&D innovation, it derives optimal decisions by maximizing 
its expected profit function. Taking the expectation for (5), we obtain 
( ) ( ) [ ( )] ( , )
0 0
2 2
p p pE a 2a 4 1 Iπ = + μ +μ + σ −α − μ σ .                                                                                           (6) 
We only solve the optimal R&D risk and ignore the optimally expected R&D outcome in this paper. 
Through taking the derivative of (6) with respect to , we get σ
( ) [ ( )] ( , )pE 1 4 1 I∂ π ∂σ = −α − ∂ μ σ ∂σ .                                                                                               (7)
According to (9), there exist four situations for PS producer’s optimal R&D risk: 
(i) when ( , )
(
I 1
4 1
∂ μ σ ≤
∂σ −α)
 (but ( , )I∂ μ σ
∂σ
isn’t identically equal 
(
1
4 1−α)
) for all , ;min max[ ,σ∈ σ σ ] * maxσ = σ
(ii) when ( , )
(
I
4 1
∂ μ σ ≥
∂σ −α)
1   (but ( , )I∂ μ σ
∂σ
isn’t identically equal 
(
1
4 1−α)
) for all , ;min max[ ,σ∈ σ σ ] * minσ = σ
(iii) when ( , )
( )
I 1
4 1
∂ μ σ
≡
∂σ −α
 ( ( , )I∂ μ σ
∂σ
is identically equal 
(
1
4 1−α)
] ]) for all , any 
is an optimal solution. We assume PS producer is conservative and choose the lowest R&D risk, i.e. 
 in this case; 
min max[ ,σ∈ σ σ min max[ ,σ∈ σ σ
*
minσ = σ
(iv) when ( , )
(
I
4 1
∂ μ σ
=
∂σ −α)
1 ) for some  (but min max( ,σ∈ σ σ
( , )I∂ μ σ
∂σ
 isn’t identically equal 
(
1
4 1−α)
), there 
exists a unique optimal solution .* minσ ∈ σ max( , )σ
2.2. PS competes with OSS 
This part supposes that there exist two software producers in the market. One is a proprietary software 
producer and the other one is an open source software producer. They are noted by producer ‘ p ’ and 
producer ‘ o ’ respectively. The inverse demand functions for proprietary and open source software are 
respectively given by
p p p p op a q q dq= + α − − ,                                                                                              (8) 
o o o o o pp a q q q dq= + α + cβ − − − ,                                                                                                            (9) 
where , , , ,pa 0> oa 0> 0 d 1< < 0 1< α < 0 < 1β <  and . In (8) and (9),  and  measure the 
reservation prices for proprietary and open source software respectively; d  presents the degree of 
substitution between proprietary and open source software;  and  denote network externality on 
the demand functions for  proprietary and open source software respectively, where  ( ) is 
producer ’s output (or call network scale); c  represents the learning (maintenance or development) cost 
when users use open source software; 
o0 c a< <
α
pa oa
iq
pq oqα
,i p o=
i
β  is the contribution degree of each user to the software 
reservation price when using open source software (or call it user’s software development skill 
parameter). 
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      The timing of producers’ activities is as follows: PS producer performs R&D investment in the first 
stage; PS and OSS producers set software quantity simultaneously in the second stage. Similarly to part 
2.1, the model is solved by backwards induction. 
Stage 2: quantity 
Open source software is usually available at no charge, so this paper assumes op 0= . Combining with 
(9), we get ( ) (o o pq a c dq 1= − − −α − )β . By substituting  into (8) and rearranging, we obtain the price of 
proprietary software 
oq
[( )( ) ( ) (( )( ) ) ] ( )
0
2
p p o pp 1 a d a c 1 1 d q 1= −α −β + λ − − − −α −α −β − −α −β .                                                 (10) 
According to (10) and op 0= , the profit functions for proprietary and open source software producer 
are respectively given by   
( , ) [( ) ( ) (( )( ) ) ] ( ) ( , )2p p p p o p pp q I 1 a d a c 1 1 d q q 1 Iπ = − μ σ = −α −β − − − −α −α −β − −α −β − μ σ ,                    (11) 
o o op q 0π = = .                                                                                                                                       
(12) 
Note that this paper assumes the marginal costs of proprietary and open source software equal zero. 
Proprietary software producer pursues profit maximization, so it decides the optimal quantity through 
(11). Taking the derivative of (11) with respect to , and then setting it equal to zero (i.e. pq p pq 0∂π ∂ = ),
we obtain the optimal quantity of PS producer 
'* [( )( ) ( )] [ (( )( ) )]
0
2
p p oq 1 a d a c 2 1 1 d= −α −β + λ − − −α −α −β − .                                                               (13) 
This paper supposes the model parameters meet the inequality . To make sure the optimal solution 
be unique,  must meet the second order condition (i.e. 
'*
pq 0>
'*
pq
2 2
p pq 0∂ π ∂ < ). This condition holds when 
[( )( )− ] ( )21 1 d 1 0−α −α β − −α −β > . This paper assumes the model parameters meet the above inequality, so 
 is the unique optimal quantity for PS producer. '*pq
Combining (13), (10) and (11), PS producer’s profit function is given by  
'
[( )( ) ( )]
( , )
( )[( )( ) ]
0
2
p o
p 2
1 a d a c
I
4 1 1 1 d
−α −β + λ − −
π = − μ σ
−α −β −α −α −β − .                                                                                            
(14) 
Stage 1: R&D innovation 
The expectation for (14) is given by 
'
( ) ( ) ( )( )( ) ( )
( ) ( , )
( )[( )( ) ]
0 0 0
2 2 2 2 2
p p o p o
p 2
1 a 2a 2d 1 a c a d a c
E I
4 1 1 1 d
−α −β + μ + μ + σ − −α −β − + μ + −
π = − μ σ
−α −β −α −α −β − .                   
(15) 
Taking the derivative of (15) with respect to σ , we derive 
'( ) ( , )
[( ) ( )]
p
2
E 1 I
4 1 d 1
∂ π ∂ μ σ
=
∂σ −α − −α −
−β ∂σ .                                                                                           
(16) 
According to (16), there exist four situations for PS producer’s optimal R&D risk: 
(i) when ( , )
[( ) ( )]2
I 1
4 1 d 1
∂ μ σ ≤
∂σ −α − −α −β  (but 
( , )I∂ μ σ
∂σ
isn’t identically equal 
[( ) ( )]2
1
4 1 d 1−α − −α −β ) for 
all σ∈ , ;min max[ ,σ σ ] '* maxσ = σ
(ii) when ( , )
[( ) ( )]2
I 1
4 1 d 1
∂ μ σ ≥
∂σ −α − −α −β   (but 
( , )I∂ μ σ
∂σ
 isn’t identically equal 
[( ) ( )]2
1
4 1 d 1−α − −α −β ) for 
all σ∈ , ;min max[ ,σ σ ] '* minσ = σ
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(iii) when ( , )
[( ) ( )]2
I 1
4 1 d 1
∂ μ σ
≡
∂σ −α − −α −β  (
( , )I∂ μ σ
∂σ
is identically equal 
[( ) ( )]2
1
4 1 d 1−α − −α −β ) for all 
, any  is an optimal solution. We assume PS producer is conservative and choose 
the lowest R&D risk, i.e.  in this case; 
min max[ ,σ∈ σ σ ] ]min max[ ,σ∈ σ σ
'*σ = σmin
(iv) when ( , )
[( ) ( )]2
I 1
4 1 d 1
∂ μ σ
=
∂σ −α − −α −β  for some  (but min max( ,σ∈ σ σ )
( , )I∂ μ σ
∂σ
isn’t identically equal 
[( ) ( )]2
1
4 1 d 1−α − −α −β ), there exists a unique optimal solution .
'*
min( ,σ ∈ σ maxσ )
3. Comparison 
In this part, the optimal R&D risks of two models obtained in part 2 are compared. For comparative 
analysis, the intensities of network externality in two models are assumed to be equal. The following 
conclusions can be proven.
Proposition 1:  (i) for a given ( , )I μ σ , there is ; (ii) there exists '* *σ ≥ σ ( , )I μ σ  making .'* *σ > σ
      The first part of proposition 1 demonstrates that the R&D risk level of PS producer isn’t higher in a 
monopoly market than in a duopoly market facing an OSS. The second part indicates that there exist 
some R&D cost functions making R&D risk level for PS producer be lower when it monopolizes the 
market than when it competes with OSS producer. 
Proposition 2: when both  and  for a given * min max( ,σ ∈ σ σ ) '* min max( , )σ ∈ σ σ ( , )I μ σ , there are (i) ; (ii) 
 increases with ,
'* *σ > σ
'* *σ −σ α β  and .d
The proposition 2 demonstrates that, if there exist inner solutions for a given R&D cost function in 
both models, the optimal R&D risk level when PS producer monopolizes the market is lower than when it 
competes with OSS producer, and the difference increases with OSS user’s software development 
capacity, the network externality intensity and substitution degree between PS and OSS. 
4. Conclusions 
We analyze how the appearance of open source software affects the R&D risk of proprietary software 
producer in this paper. Proprietary software producer pursues profit maximization and open source 
software is free for users. Moreover, we assume the software market exhibits network externality. The 
following conclusions are obtained: (i) the R&D risk level for PS producer isn’t higher (resp. there exist 
R&D cost functions making the R&D risk level for PS producer be lower) when the software market is 
monopolized by PS than when it also exists OSS; (ii) if there exist inner solutions for a given R&D cost 
function, the optimal R&D risk level when PS producer monopolizes the market is lower than when it 
competes with OSS producer, and the R&D level difference increases with the OSS user’s software 
development skill, the network externality intensity and substitution degree between PS and OSS. 
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